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Unequal property rights: 
A study of land right inequalities in Rwanda 
 
Ann-Sofie Isaksson∗
 
 
Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to examine the existence and patterns of systematic within-
country inequalities in effective land rights in Rwanda. The results of empirical estimations drawing 
on data on the land tenure arrangements of over 5,000 Rwandan households indeed suggest systematic 
within-country inequalities in land rights, with households headed by women or young individuals, 
households that have been displaced due to conflict, and households in the Imidugudu village 
settlements reporting significantly weaker rights than their respective comparison groups. The 
observed inequalities are not only the result of variation in tenure arrangements, but also exist when 
comparing households cultivating plots under similar land tenure regimes. Finding within-country 
inequalities in effective property rights highlights the need to – unlike much of the quantitative 
literature in the field – carefully evaluate how property rights apply to different segments of a 
country’s population. For Rwanda, which is in the process of implementing an extensive land reform, 
this is especially relevant. 
 
JEL classification: D02, K11, O12, O55, Q15, R14, R52 
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1 Introduction 
 
Having secure property rights is important for economic development. There is widespread 
consensus on this issue among economists, and by now there is a large literature suggesting 
that country differences in the extent of property rights protection can help explain cross-
country variation in economic development (see e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; and Rodrik et al., 2004). 
While the economics literature on property rights institutions often focuses on property 
rights measured at the country level, a number of recent studies stress the existence of 
systematic within-country variation in effective property rights protection (Pande and Udry, 
2006; Dercon and Ayalew, 2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Isaksson, 2011b). A key 
argument is that in many developing countries, formal property law and customary property 
rights arrangements exist in parallel, resulting in property rights that are ambiguous and 
negotiable and thereby prone to inequalities based in status and resource differentials.  
Systematic group inequalities in property rights protection – e.g. between rich and poor or 
men and women – thus risk reinforcing existing economic inequalities, and should have 
important consequences for how we measure property rights at the country level. Focusing on 
the operation of a specific property rights institution – land rights – in a specific country – 
Rwanda – the present paper explores the existence of within-country inequality in property 
rights protection.   
Drawing on data on the land tenure arrangements of over 5,000 Rwandan households, the 
aim is to examine the existence and patterns of systematic within-country inequalities in 
effective land rights. I ask what, if any, the important dimensions of land right inequalities in 
Rwanda are, and if they originate in variation in tenure arrangements or if there are 
differences in effective land rights across households cultivating plots under similar de jure 
land tenure regimes. The results of the empirical estimations suggest systematic within-
country inequalities in land rights, in particular between female- and male-headed households, 
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both when considering rights irrespective of land tenure arrangement and when comparing 
households cultivating plots under similar land tenure regimes. 
Land rights are important – in terms of their general economic consequences, for 
developing countries in particular, and arguably especially so in Rwanda. Weak land rights 
deter investment, reduce the ability of borrowers to use land as collateral as well as inhibit 
land transactions meaning that potential gains from trade are lost. Also, with insecure land 
rights, the owner of a plot of land may feel the need to divert valuable resources like labour to 
guard the land (Besley and Ghatak, 2009). A growing micro literature finds empirical support 
for these linkages (see e.g. Besley, 1995; Field, 2005, 2007; Deininger et al., 2006; Dercon 
and Ayalew, 2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010). In a 
developing country context, land is a key asset for the rural poor, often constituting the 
primary source of their livelihood. Providing secure land rights could thus significantly 
increase the asset base of poor people, affecting their ability to produce for subsistence and 
for the market as well as their opportunities and incentives to invest (Deininger, 2003). In 
addition, insecure land rights, which give rise to overlapping claims to plots, is often cited as a 
source of conflict (Deininger et al., 2006).  
For this reason, it is hard to overestimate the importance of land rights in the Rwandan 
context. Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, and the pressure on 
land has often been put forward as an important factor in the 1994 genocide (see e.g. André 
and Platteau, 1998; Kairaba, 2002; Musahara and Huggins, 2005; Vervimp, 2004; and 
Yanagizawa, 2006). Besides being a human tragedy, the civil war and genocide disrupted 
existing land occupancy patterns and created an urgent need for land reform. This reform 
process has now been initiated, with a new land law put forward and a process of land 
registration underway (more on this in Sections 2.2-2.3).  
The present paper thus has valuable policy implications. For the Rwandan land reform 
process to promote equitable development, it is crucial that policy makers are aware of 
existing inequalities in terms of effective land rights. This should help guide the 
implementation process and provide a point of reference for future evaluation of the 
distributional effects of the reform. While there are some qualitative accounts related to land 
right inequalities in Rwanda (Rose, 2004, and Daley et al., 2010, on women’s land rights and 
Rose, 2005, on the land rights of orphans; see Section 2.3), I am not aware of any paper 
examining Rwandan land right inequalities quantitatively.  
Moreover, finding within-country inequalities in effective property rights has important 
implications for research. In particular, it highlights the need for country-level measures of 
property rights to evaluate the property rights protection applying to different segments of a 
country’s population. It suggests that considering national de jure rights is not enough, and 
that assuming that the effective rights reported by one group apply to all is misleading. With 
respect to land, if there are inequalities not only in terms of the size of land holdings but also 
in terms of property rights to land, this constitutes an important inequality dimension that 
should not be overlooked when studying the effects of land tenure reform. A large qualitative 
literature discusses the comparative land rights of specific groups, such as women (see e.g. 
Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997; Rose, 2004, and Daley et al., 2010). 
However, while a growing number of quantitative studies investigate the effects of within-
country variation in land rights (see e.g. Besley, 1995; Field, 2005, 2007; Deininger et al., 
2006; Dercon and Ayalew, 2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 
2010), they do not focus on examining the pattern of systematic variation – i.e. the very 
inequalities – in land rights.  
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2 Land right inequalities 
 
Property rights can be defined as the institutional framework in place to protect the right of an 
owner of a good or asset to use it for consumption and income generation, to transfer it to 
another party, and to use it to contract with other parties (Besley and Ghatak, 2009). 
Correspondingly, property rights to land, or land rights, could be said to refer to the use, 
transfer and contracting rights with respect to the asset land. Land right inequalities, in turn, 
refer to systematic group inequalities in effective land rights (for a discussion of group 
inequalities, see Stewart, 2002). In this section I will first discuss the basic argument behind 
the hypothesised existence of land right inequalities and the treatment of land right 
inequalities in the literature. I will then provide some background information on Rwandan 
land use and land rights and discuss what land right inequality dimensions are relevant to 
consider in the Rwandan context.   
 
2.1 Basic argument and treatment in the literature 
 
A key to understanding land right inequalities lies in the coexistence of formal and informal 
property rights institutions or, put differently, in the gap between de jure and de facto land 
rights. Whereas land laws may well be discriminatory – for instance, women’s ability to 
inherit land is restricted in many societies (Deininger et al., 2010) – inequalities in effective 
land rights could exist in spite of non-discriminatory land legislation. This is especially true in 
developing countries, where customary land arrangements often play an important role. 
Arguably, the dual land system prevalent in many developing countries – with formal 
land law and customary land arrangements existing in parallel – gives rise to ambiguous and 
thus negotiable land rights. This in turn opens up for land right inequalities originating in – 
and potentially reinforcing – existing inequalities in resources and social status. 
The household resource base affects the capacity to invest in land in order to get more 
secure property rights (e.g. by planting trees; see Besley, 1995), the means available to protect 
the land, who has the informational advantage in a land dispute, who can afford to go to court 
to settle disputes, and, if registering land is costly, who has the resources to go through with 
this process. Likewise, the social status of a household is likely to affect its bargaining power 
in land disputes; the cost of challenging the household’s land rights should presumably 
depend on its connections and status in the community (see e.g. Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997, and 
Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997).  
As noted, while a growing quantitative literature investigates the effects of within-country 
variation in land rights (see e.g. Besley, 1995; Field, 2005, 2007; Deininger et al., 2006; 
Dercon and Ayalew, 2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010), they 
do not focus on examining the very inequalities in rights over land. Nevertheless, studying the 
effects of variation in land rights at the micro level of course rests on the assumption that 
there is indeed variation in land rights across households or individuals within a country. In 
fact, all the above studies acknowledge (and take steps to deal with) that land rights are 
endogenous and based in factors such as wealth, connections and previous land investment. 
Goldstein and Udry (2008) stress that land rights in Ghana are ambiguous and negotiable, 
that they vary across plots and individuals, and that they are closely linked to positions in 
local social/political hierarchies. In their own words, “tenure security is not a universal 
attribute of an individual. Rather, an individual’s security of tenure over a particular plot 
reflects that individual’s position within the local social and political hierarchy and the 
manner in which the plot was obtained” (Goldstein and Udry, 2008, p. 1009). They argue that 
whereas a cultivator’s rights over a plot are relatively secure while growing crops, when 
leaving the land fallow – a form of land investment to increase future yields – there is a risk of 
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losing the rights to the plot. Their empirical findings suggest that individuals who hold 
powerful positions in a local social or political hierarchy have more secure land rights and that 
as a consequence they fallow their land longer and thus get higher output. Their findings also 
demonstrate how these status-related land rights tend to work against women, who experience 
higher risks of losing their plots while leaving it fallow, and therefore fallow less and thus 
receive lower yields on their fields. Similarly, Pande and Udry (2006) stress the within-
country heterogeneity of effective land rights, suggesting that there is a distribution of tenure 
security within a country, and Dercon and Ayalew (2007), who study the effects of land rights 
in Ethiopia, emphasise that land rights vary across households and over time, and depend on 
the economic, social and political position of the household.  
Besley (1995) acknowledges that households in Ghana enjoy different rights on different 
plots of land and considers the effects of variation in land rights on field-specific investment. 
To deal with reverse causality from investment to land rights, he instruments for land rights, 
and his first-stage (2SLS) regressions – using land rights as dependent variable – reveal e.g. 
that the number of women in the household is negatively associated with rights. Similarly, 
studying the effects of land rights in Uganda, Deininger et al. (2006) instrument for land 
rights, and their first-stage regressions suggest a significant impact of how the field was 
acquired on land rights and indicate that female-headed households have weaker rights.1
Hence, while focusing on the effects of variation in land rights rather than on the 
variation per se, these studies clearly suggest that land right inequalities are present. 
Obviously, if the resource base, social status and connections of a household are factors that 
matter for its effective land rights, then we cannot consider property rights to land as 
something that is exogenously given by non-discriminatory formal legislation applying 
equally to all, meaning that exploring the dimensions of effective land right inequalities is 
warranted.  
 
As we will see in the next section, Rwanda fits well with the description of a dual system 
for land rights, with both formal legislation and a strong influence of customary land 
arrangements. It remains to be seen whether this has translated into systematic inequalities in 
effective land rights.  
 
2.2 Background on Rwandan land use and land rights 
 
Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, with over 90 percent of the 
active population supported by agriculture, the vast majority on subsistence scale (Kairaba, 
2002). Naturally, this strains the country’s scarce land resources; the average land holding per 
household dropped from 2 hectares in 1960 to 0.7 in the early 1990s, and in 2001 almost 60 
percent of the households cultivated less than 0.5 hectares (Musahara and Huggins, 2005). 
Given the pressure on land, having a well-functioning system for land rights is central. 
While in the process of changing, Rwanda could be said to have a dual land right system 
(Kairaba, 2002; Republic of Rwanda, 2004b). First, customary rights are applicable to almost 
all rural land, traditionally involving successive father-to-son inheritance of smaller and 
smaller land parcels. Second, the statutory written law governs land in urban areas and some 
rural lands managed by churches and companies.2
                                                 
1 Besley (1995) uses information on whether there is a transfer deed for the field, whether the household has ever 
litigated over its right to the field, how the field was acquired (purchased, allocated, appropriated, gifted, or 
inherited), how many years the field has been owned, and the number of trees existing at the time of acquisition 
to instrument for land rights. Deininger et al. (2006) use variables capturing modes of land acquisition as 
identifying instruments. 
 
2 For an account of the historical – pre-colonial and colonial – evolution of land rights in Rwanda, see e.g. 
Kairaba (2002), Republic of Rwanda (2004b) Section, 2.1-2.2, and Rose (2004). 
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The high pressure on land, coupled with confusions and contradictions between written 
legislation and popular conceptions of customary land rights, means that land has often been a 
source of conflict. As noted, several studies point to land as an important factor in the 1994 
genocide (see e.g. André and Platteau, 1998; Kairaba, 2002; Musahara and Huggins, 2005; 
Vervimp, 2004; and Yanagizawa, 2006). Clearly, the war and genocide amplified the 
Rwandan land use problem. The deaths of around one million people and the internal and 
external displacements of millions of others disrupted existing land occupancy patterns and 
gave rise to multiple claims to plots, in turn resulting in conflicts over land. Reportedly, 
around 80 percent of disputes taken up in province courts have to do with land (Global IDP 
project, 2005b). Against this background, it is not surprising that the consensus view is that 
reform is necessary (Hoyweghen, 1999; UNDAF, 2001; Musahara and Huggins, 2005; 
ICARRD, 2006; Wyss 2006). 
Land reform has indeed been initiated; the new inheritance law of 1999 (Republic of 
Rwanda, 1999), the National Land Policy of 2004 (Republic of Rwanda, 2004b) and the Land 
Law of 2005 (Republic of Rwanda, 2005) together constitute a new body of land policy and 
law improving land rights for women (I will return to this in Section 2.3), promoting rational 
land use, and emphasising land registration (the formalisation of customary titles) and land 
consolidation.  
Whereas commentators agree that land reform is necessary, there are also concerns that 
costs of information, land registration fees, demands for rational land use and land 
consolidation, etc. will enable actors with more resources to exploit the situation and acquire 
land from poor people with small landholdings under customary tenure arrangements (for a 
critical discussion of the new Land Law, see Kairaba, 2002; Musahara and Huggins, 2005; 
and Pottier, 2006). It is clear that land reform is a sensitive issue with extremely important 
distributional consequences. 
While the new legislation has been put forward, the implementation process has only 
started – institutional change is a slow process, the existing customary system is firmly 
rooted, and it will take considerable time before the de jure rights translate into effective land 
rights applying to Rwandan land users. The results in the present paper are based on data from 
2005/06, and will thus not capture the effects of the land reform. Rather, they will provide 
insights on systematic land right inequalities existing in the break between the old and the 
new system. As such, they could provide guidance relevant for the implementation of the land 
reform, as well as a point of reference for future evaluation of its distributional impact.  
 
2.3 Land right inequalities: the Rwandan context 
 
The answer to the question of what land right inequality dimensions are relevant to consider 
of course depends on the context. In Rwanda, the answer is shaped by the tragic events of 
1994. With the war and genocide and the turmoil that followed in mind, it is of interest to 
explore the comparative land right status of female-headed households, young household 
heads, conflict-induced migrants and households resettled in the Imidugudu village 
settlements.3
The civil war and genocide – which involved the deaths of around one million individuals 
and internal and external displacement of several millions – resulted in a sharp rise in the 
number of female- and child-headed households. During the genocide, men were 
disproportionately targeted, leaving Rwanda with a skewed demographic structure and vast 
numbers of widows and orphans. Today, women make up around 52% of the Rwandan 
 
                                                 
3 Considering the endogeneity of economic standing in this context – while income could presumably affect a 
household’s effective land rights, its land rights should of course also affect income – I do not explore variation 
in land rights across income segments. 
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population and head some 35% of all Rwandan households (Daley et al., 2010), and estimates 
(albeit varying) suggest that there are hundreds of thousands of orphans, many of whom have 
had to act as household heads (Rose, 2005).  
Traditionally, the land rights of Rwandan women have been weak. According to custom, 
land ownership in Rwanda is the prerogative of men, with land being inherited from father to 
son (Republic of Rwanda, 2004b). Sons received land from their fathers when reaching 
maturity, usually at the time of marriage. Women, on the other hand, received only usufruct 
rights – from their father or some other male relative if they were unmarried and from their 
husbands if they were married (Rose, 2004, 2005). Even as a widow, a woman was only 
entitled usufruct rights over family land while waiting for her sons to reach maturity. And if 
her husband died before they had children, a woman could not claim any of her husband’s 
land unless she married one of his brothers, in which case the new husband became the owner 
of the land (Republic of Rwanda, 2004b).  
 However, several pieces of new legislation have now significantly improved the de jure 
land rights of Rwandan women (for a detailed account, see Rose, 2004, and Daley et al., 
2010). The inheritance law put forward in 1999 specifies that all legitimate children shall 
inherit equally without any discrimination between males and females (Republic of Rwanda, 
1999, Article 50). The National Land Policy of 2004 establishes that ‘all Rwandans enjoy the 
same rights of access to land without any discrimination whatsoever’ (Republic of Rwanda, 
2004b, p. 23). Additionally, the Land Law of 2005 makes clear that ‘discrimination either 
based on sex or origin in matters relating to ownership or possession of rights over the land is 
prohibited’, and that ‘the wife and the husband have equal rights over the land’ (Republic of 
Rwanda, 2005, Article 4).  
Although this new body of legislation constitutes a progressive first step towards 
strengthening women’s land rights, merely formulating policy documents and laws is not 
enough. Institutional change is a slow process, and a significant challenge remains at the level 
of implementation. The fieldwork of Daley et al. (2010), conducted in 2006, suggests an 
increased tendency of young women to receive some portion (albeit small and comparatively 
infertile) of their parents’ land at the time of its distribution within the family. However, their 
findings also indicate a limited awareness about the new body of land policy and law, as well 
as significant resistance to change due to deeply-ingrained cultural norms.4
Turning to the land rights of child-headed households, after 1994, many newly orphaned 
children returned to their communities to find that the land of their deceased parents had been 
taken over by others. As described in Rose (2005), the orphans faced barriers in terms of 
information, status, experience, and resources when defending their land claims, and the 
existing customary laws were ill-equipped to protect their interests. The land rights of 
orphans, particularly girls, were limited under customary law, and they needed guardians to 
represent their interests. In many cases, however, the close relatives who could have served as 
guardians had died during the war, and when relatives did in fact become guardians, it was 
not uncommon that they competed with the orphans for the scarce land rather than helped 
them to protect their land rights. Also, orphans’ land rights were reportedly not always 
respected by local authorities, who sometimes allocated their land to returning refugees (Rose, 
 Seemingly, the 
recent improvements in the de jure land rights of women have a long way to go before they 
translate into gender equality in actual land practices. With this ongoing process in mind, it 
seems highly relevant to quantitatively explore effective land right inequalities across female- 
and male-headed households.  
                                                 
4 In addition, there are remaining weaknesses in the law, e.g. with respect to women’s land rights in case of 
separation or divorce and the land rights of non-legally married women and ‘illegitimate children’ (Kairaba, 
2002; Daley et al., 2010). 
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2005). Against this background, it seems relevant to consider the comparative land rights of 
households headed by young individuals. 
With respect to the land rights of conflict-induced migrants, as noted, the civil war and 
genocide brought massive population displacements. The period after the genocide saw the 
return of millions of refugees – both those who had been refused entry to the country for 
decades (the so called old case-load, or OCL, refugees), those who fled the country during the 
genocide, and those who had been internally displaced during the same period.5
A final dimension of potential land right inequality in Rwanda concerns households 
resettled into the ‘Imidugudu’ village settlements. The 1996 villagisation policy, or 
Imidugudu, was initially designed to help resolve the housing shortage and address the 
problem of settlement and land use following the refugee inflows and the destruction of 
houses and infrastructure during the war and genocide. At the time of implementation, 
however, it was redefined as an ambitious development programme
 Given the 
scale of the conflict-induced displacement, and the multiple claims to plots that this reportedly 
often resulted in (Musahara and Huggins, 2005), it seems highly relevant to explore possible 
land right inequalities across migrant and non-migrant groups.  
6
 
 establishing that all 
Rwandans living in scattered homesteads should be regrouped into village settlements (Global 
IDP Project, 2005a). The programme has faced substantial criticism (see the discussion in 
Isaksson, 2011a). Objections have not least concerned land allocation; there have been reports 
of forced relocations and of lack of compensation to people whose land was confiscated for 
the purpose of building Imidugudu sites, and it has been suggested that each Imidugudu 
household has been allocated too little land and that the new fields are located too far away 
from the farmers’ houses (UNDG, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2001; Global IDP Project, 
2005b). By 1999-2000, when the construction of new sites waned off, the policy had already 
affected nearly 20 percent of the population (Republic of Rwanda, 2004). Considering the 
wide coverage of the villagisation policy, and its important implications for land allocation, 
living in Imidugudu settlements seems to be an important dimension to consider when 
exploring potential land right inequalities in Rwanda.  
3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
The aim of the present paper is to examine the existence and patterns of systematic land right 
inequalities in Rwanda. To this end, I use data on land tenure arrangements obtained from 
Rwanda’s 2005/06 EICV2 (Enquete Intégrale sur le Conditions de Vie des Ménages) 
household survey, yielding a sample of 5,279 rural households, and estimate the following 
benchmark OLS equation: 
 
iriiii αR εδβ ++++= γHHCLAG . 
 
That is, the land rights of household i ( iR ) are taken to depend on household group 
affiliations ( iG ), household land assets ( iLA ), and household composition factors ( iHHC ), 
allowing for region fixed effects rγ . Being interested in systematic group inequalities in 
effective land rights, the key set of parameters is given by α . To explore whether land 
inequalities originate in systematic variation in tenure arrangements or whether there are 
differences in effective land rights across households cultivating plots under the same de jure 
                                                 
5 For an in-depth account of Rwandan displacement patterns, and of the history of the OCL and NCL refugee 
groups, see Global IDP project (2005a,b). 
6 The hope was that settling people in clusters would facilitate the provision of basic services and infrastructure 
and help develop markets with opportunities for non-agricultural activity. 
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land tenure regimes, I alter the dependent variable in focus (see Section 3.1). To investigate 
the importance of cross-cutting inequalities, I also run estimations including interaction terms 
between the group affiliations in iG . Below I discuss the key variables included in the 
empirical analysis (for variable definitions and summary statistics, see Tables A1-A2). 
 
3.1 Dependent variables 
 
The outcome variable of interest is land rights. As noted in Section 2.1, the concept of land 
rights can be taken to incorporate the use, transfer and contracting rights over the asset land. 
For each of their plots, the households are asked to specify whether they have the right to sell 
or mortgage the land. To proxy for land rights, I use this information on perceived transfer 
and contracting rights, constructing variables measuring the share of each household’s land 
area that reportedly can be sold or mortgaged.  
Here, a couple of notes are in order. First, with customary land arrangements playing an 
important role, what is relevant to consider is effective, or de facto as opposed to de jure, land 
rights (for a discussion, see Pande and Udry, 2006). Inequalities in effective land rights need 
not necessarily imply discriminatory formal land legislation, but could be the result of 
inequalities inherent in customary arrangements, and of limited enforcement and knowledge 
of formal law. Second, being based on survey responses, the land right variables used in the 
present paper measure perceived land rights. As such, they should reasonably capture the 
perception of the effective land rights facing the household as opposed to de jure land rights 
as prescribed in formal legislation. While we cannot be sure that perceived land rights 
correspond exactly to the de facto land rights facing households,  economists tend to be 
interested in how land rights affect economic outcomes, and perceived rights is what will 
govern behavior (for a discussion, see Ayalew and Dercon, 2007). 
The first dependent variable – rights over total land – considers the share of each 
household’s total utilised land area (including land that is loaned, leased, sharecropped etc.) 
that it reports it can sell or mortgage. On average, this share is 0.6 (see Table A2). A 
household’s use and transfer rights to a plot will depend on its land tenure arrangements. 
Since we are interested in effective land rights inequalities, it is highly relevant to take into 
account inequalities that are due to systematic variation in land tenure regimes – i.e. which 
households own their land and which ones instead tend to lease, sharecrop etc.   
However, there is also the concern that effective land rights might vary systematically 
across households cultivating plots under the same land tenure arrangements. To distinguish 
between this form of land right inequality and land right inequalities that are due to systematic 
inequalities in land tenure arrangements, I also run estimations using two alternative 
dependent variables. The first – share of land owned – simply gives the share of the 
household’s utilised land that is owned. I classify land as owned if to the question of how the 
land was acquired the respondent answers that it was bought, inherited, given as a gift or 
obtained through other means (implying that that leased, loaned, sharecropped and 
appropriated land is not classified as owned). On average, the share of the sample households’ 
land that can be classified as owned is 0.84. The second – rights over owned land – gives the 
share of the households’ owned land that reportedly can be sold or mortgaged. For this 
variable, the sample average is 0.71.  
To make sure that the results are not contingent on using land right measures focusing on 
the share of land areas with rights, as a robustness check I consider dummy variables 
indicating whether the household perceives itself to have sale or mortgage rights over any of 
its total or owned plots.  
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3.2 Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory variables in focus are the potential land inequality dimensions discussed in 
Section 2.3, as captured by the group affiliation variables ( iG ) in the benchmark regression 
setup. Against the background of the war and genocide, I explore the comparative land right 
status of female-headed households, households with young household heads, conflict-
induced migrant groups, and households resettled in the Imidugudu village settlements.  
To capture female-headed households I use a dummy variable taking the value one if the 
reported household head is female (28 percent of our sample households).7 Unfortunately, the 
data contains no satisfactory information allowing us to capture the child-headed households 
produced by the war and genocide.8 We have information on the age of the household head, 
however, and can thus explore potential variation in effective land rights across household 
head age groups. I consider age in years (plus its square term) as well as age group dummies. 
18 percent of our sample households are under the age of 30, which means that they were 18 
our younger at the time of the genocide. To capture conflict-displaced households I use a 
dummy variable taking the value one if the household head reports to have been displaced due 
to conflict and to have arrived at the current region of residence between 1994 and 2000 (29 
percent of the sample households).9
When examining the existence of land right inequalities along these dimensions, one has 
to consider that households have multiple group affiliations, which in terms of the concerned 
inequalities could be reinforcing or contradictory (for a discussion of the importance of 
considering intersectionality when studying group inequalities, see Anthias, 1998). Moreover, 
in many cases group overlaps are likely to be systematic – we know, for instance, that conflict 
returnees and female-headed households are over-represented in the Imidugudu settlements 
(Isaksson, 2011a). Against this background, when examining land right inequalities associated 
with one particular group dimension, it seems appropriate to condition on the other group 
affiliations deemed relevant, as well as to explore cross-cutting inequalities – i.e. whether 
intersecting group affiliations reinforce or offset each other in terms of land right inequalities. 
To approach the latter, I run estimations including interaction terms between the above group 
dimensions.  
 Second, to proxy for being an OCL refugee – a sub-group 
of the conflict displaced – I use a dummy variable taking the value one for households that 
have been conflict displaced (according to the above definition) and whose point of out-
migration (proxied by the year the household head settled in the household’s current residence 
minus the number of years the household resided in the previous location) was before 1990. 
Five percent of the sample households belong to this group. Finally, I use a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household lives in an Imidugudu settlement. While 18 percent of the 
surveyed rural households report doing so, the great majority of households still live in 
isolated communities. 
I control for household land assets, household composition variables, and regional 
variation. To find out whether land right inequalities constitute an inequality dimension that 
exists on top of inequalities in terms of the size and composition of household land 
holdings,10
                                                 
7 While it would be interesting to consider potential variation in land rights between males and females within 
the household, the data unfortunately restricts us to considering variation across households. 
 or whether they simply pick up the latter, I control for the total size of household 
8 The survey only asks respondents below the age of 20 about whether their parents are alive, and there is no 
information on when parents died. Respondents who were younger than 20 at the time of the survey (less than 1 
percent of the household heads in the sample) were 8 years or younger at the time of the genocide. Hence, we 
cannot capture the group of somewhat older genocide orphans, who were presumably more likely to end up 
having to head a household.  
9 Different cut-off dates are used as robustness checks, with no change in results.  
10 Unfortunately, there is no good proxy for land quality in the data. 
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land holdings (in log hectares) and land fragmentation. With respect to the size of land 
holdings, households with large land assets are likely to be resource rich as well as 
comparatively powerful in local social and political hierarchies. In line with the discussion in 
Section 2.1, this should make them better able to defend their land rights, which presumably 
also makes them more confident in their rights to sell or mortgage their fields without being 
challenged.11
Turning to the household composition controls, I account for household size (number of 
household members) and age composition (the share of household members of working age), 
and for the household head being married or a widow/er. According to the discussion in 
Section 2.3, which suggests that men traditionally receive land from their fathers at the time 
of marriage and that women often lose their rights over the household land if their husbands 
die, marital status should affect land rights. Moreover, in line with the reasoning in Section 
2.1, we cannot rule out that land rights depend on household size and age composition, via 
e.g. the household availability of guard labour. Table 1 shows that the family composition 
variables tend to vary systematically across our focus groups. In particular, female household 
heads are often unmarried or widows. With this in mind, we would like to know whether 
observed group inequalities are due to systematic group variation in family composition or 
whether they in fact persist when comparing, say, widowed female and male household heads.  
 With respect to land fragmentation, the traditional system of father-to-son land 
inheritance, i.e. dividing up the family land among the sons of the family, has contributed to 
increasingly fragmented landholdings (ICARRD, 2006). Besides supposedly affecting farm 
yields negatively, land fragmentation could have a negative effect on effective land rights 
since it makes supervision and protection of the land difficult (see Bizimana et al., 2004). To 
capture fragmented landholdings I use the Simpson index for farm fragmentation (see Table 
A1), which ranges from 0 to 1 and takes the value 0 when the farm consists of a single parcel 
and approaches 1 for farms split into many plots of equal size. 
Finally, with respect to the regional controls, 11 region dummies12
 
 or 440 cluster 
dummies are included to pick up potential regional variation in effective land rights resulting 
e.g. from differences in population density or land quality, in turn affecting the pressure on 
land. The regional controls allow us to explore whether the observed group variation in land 
rights is due to certain groups being overrepresented in certain areas of the country, or 
whether they also exist when comparing groups within regions or village clusters.  
4 Results 
 
Looking at the group means in Table 1, we can see that while there is systematic variation 
across groups both in terms of reported land rights and in terms of land tenure arrangements, 
the two do not always go together in the expected way. Compared to male-headed 
households, female-headed households tend to have smaller landholdings, which to a greater 
extent have been inherited or received as a gift, and to a lesser extent have been purchased, or 
are leased or sharecropped. However, in spite of supposedly owning a larger share of their 
land, female-headed households to a lesser extent report to have the right to sell and mortgage 
it. The land rights of younger, as compared to older, household heads appear more in line with 
differences in tenure arrangements. Households with younger household heads do not only 
tend to have less land, they also tend to own less of their land – a small portion of it has been 
                                                 
11 There is an element of endogeneity involved here; households with better land rights might reap economic 
benefits enabling them to acquire more land. Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore to what extent land right 
inequalities remain when controlling for inequalities in terms of land holdings. 
12The region dummies refer to the administrative structure which existed at the onset of the EICV data collection 
period and according to which Rwanda was divided into 12 (11 rural) provinces. Today, Rwanda is formally 
divided into the Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western provinces, plus the City of Kigali. 
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purchased and more of it is leased, loaned or sharecropped – implying that they also have less 
land with sale and mortgage rights. Although compared to their non-displaced and non-
Imidugudu counterparts households that have been displaced due to conflict and households 
living in Imidugudu settlements tend to have land holdings of similar size and tend to own 
their land to similar extents, the latter groups have inherited less of their land and instead 
stand out by having received land as a gift or having acquired it through alternative means 
(e.g. appropriation and being allocated land by the government). They also report weaker 
rights over their land, both when considering the total area of utilised land and when focusing 
solely on the land they actually own.  
However, while revealing some important patterns, comparing group means ignores the 
fact that households have multiple group affiliations, which in terms of effective land rights 
could be reinforcing or contradictory, and which are likely to overlap systematically. Hence, 
when examining land right inequalities associated with one particular group identification it is 
appropriate to condition on the other group affiliations that are deemed relevant.  
Table 2 presents the results of regressions using the share of the households’ total land 
holdings (including land that is loaned, leased or sharecropped) that can be sold or mortgaged 
as dependent variable. As it turns out, conditioning on all group affiliations (Regression 1), 
the main pattern observed in Table 1 remains intact.  
Most strikingly, the result that female-headed households have weaker land rights is 
consistent over all specifications. Controlling for the size and fragmentation of the 
households’ land holdings (Regression 3) does not change this picture. Neither does taking 
the fact that female household heads are often unmarried or widows into account. In fact, 
when controlling for household composition variables including marital status and being a 
widow/widower (Regression 4), the difference between female- and male-headed households, 
if anything, becomes more pronounced. If female-headed households are more prevalent in 
certain regions of the country (e.g. due to more genocide survivors settling in certain areas) 
and effective land rights vary across regions (e.g. due to regional differences in population 
density or land quality, in turn affecting the pressure on land) this could influence the 
estimate. However, when accounting for average land right differences across provinces 
(Regression 5) or village clusters (Regression 6), the gender gap is still there. Conditional on 
the full set of controls, the share of household land that can be sold or mortgaged is around 8 
percentage points smaller for female- than for male-headed households.  
The results still indicate that households with older household heads have better rights 
(the effect being slightly diminishing as evidenced by the negative, albeit very small, 
coefficient on the age square term). However, when conditioning for the household 
composition variables (Regression 4), the age of the household head no longer comes out with 
a statistically significant coefficient. Presumably, the observed age effect picked up 
differences in, say, marital status.  
Also, when controlling for all group affiliations, then having been displaced due to 
conflict and living in Imidugudu settlements are both still negatively related to land rights. 
Controlling for if the household belongs to the sub-group of the conflict-displaced households 
known as the ‘old case-load’ refugees (Regression 2), it seems as though the conflict-
displaced households with comparatively weak land rights are those who were displaced in 
connection to the genocide. Controlling for land assets (Regression 3) and household 
composition variables (Regression 4) does not change this picture. However, the observed 
group inequalities do not remain in the face of the regional controls (Regressions 5-6), 
seemingly suggesting that the weaker land rights observed for these groups are due to a 
common tendency for weaker rights in regions/villages where the concerned groups are over-
represented. While their coefficients are not presented, it is interesting to note that the great 
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majority of the region/village dummies come out statistically significant, suggesting 
systematic regional variation in perceived land rights.13
As noted above, inequalities in rights over the total land utilised by the household, i.e. 
including land that is loaned, leased or sharecropped, should to a large extent depend on 
systematic variation in tenure arrangements. It is interesting to distinguish between this form 
of land right inequality and possible inequalities in effective land rights existing across 
households cultivating plots under similar land tenure arrangements.  
  
The group means in Table 1 seemed to suggest that the variations in terms of land rights 
and of land ownership status do not always go together in the expected way. In particular, the 
comparison of means suggested that female-headed households own a larger share of their 
land than do male-headed households, yet nevertheless report weaker rights. And as it turns 
out, running regressions using the share of the households’ land holdings that can be classified 
as owned as dependent variable (Table 3), the observed inequalities in ownership shares do 
not follow the same pattern as inequalities in rights over total utilised land. Conditioning on 
all group affiliations (Table 3, Regression 1), the only inequality that is similar to what we 
observed for rights over total land is the positive age effect, which does not withstand the 
introduction of the household composition and regional controls (Regressions 4-6). There is 
no statistically significant difference between female- and male-headed households, and when 
including the full set of controls (Regression 6) the estimation actually suggests a greater 
ownership share among households that have recently been displaced due to conflict.  
Considering regressions focusing on the rights over owned land (Table 4), however, the 
displayed group inequality patterns are very similar to those observed for rights over total 
land holdings. Households with older household heads still report stronger rights (now, the 
effect does not withstand the introduction of the land assets controls), and female-headed, 
Imidugudu and conflict-displaced households still report weaker rights. The only substantial 
difference is that the sub-group of the conflict-displaced households who have been out of the 
country for a longer period of time – the OCL returnees – actually report stronger rights on 
owned land. In line with this finding, it has been suggested that OCL returnees received better 
assistance in terms of land allocation during the resettlement process than did those who were 
displaced during the genocide (Musahara and Huggins, 2005; Wyss, 2006). Yet again, as for 
rights over total land, the observed group inequalities for the conflict-displaced households – 
OCL or otherwise – do not remain in the face of the regional controls (Regressions 5-6), 
which seemingly suggests that they have to do with the refugee groups resettling in regions 
that differ in terms of effective land rights. For instance, many OCL refugees settled in the 
relatively sparsely populated eastern part of the country (Takeuchi and Marara, 2007).  
As noted, considering that households have multiple group affiliations – which might 
reinforce or offset each other in terms of land right inequalities – it is relevant to explore the 
impact of intersecting group connections. Table 5 presents the results of estimations including 
interaction terms between the key group dimensions, focusing on rights over total land (Panel 
A) and rights over owned land (Panel B).  As it turns out, the evidence for group interaction 
effects is relatively limited. While there is some indication that female-headed households 
                                                 
13 Furthermore, with respect to the included land asset controls, we can note that households with larger and less 
fragmented land holdings tend to report stronger rights. This could reflect that more resource-rich households are 
better able to defend their land rights (or for that matter that households with better land rights reap economic 
benefits enabling them to acquire more and better quality land). As regards the household composition controls, 
household size and share of adults do not come out significantly related to land rights. On the other hand, being 
married and being a widow/er are both positively related to rights. The positive effect of being married should 
reflect the tradition to receive land when marrying (see the discussion in Section 2.3). Considering that we have 
an indicator capturing whether the household is headed by a female in the regression, the widow/er dummy 
presumably picks up the effect of being a widower rather than a widow.  
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living in the Imidugudu settlements have particularly weak rights over total land (seemingly, 
living in Imidugudu is only negatively related with rights among households headed by 
women), and that conflict-displaced households fare worse in terms of land rights if the 
household head is relatively old,14 the concerned interaction parameters are only weakly 
statistically significant. The interaction effect suggesting that Imidugudu households have 
weaker rights over total land if the household head is older is somewhat more stable,15
The results in Tables 2 and 4 suggested that Imidugudu households have the right to sell 
and mortgage a smaller share of their land, but that this difference has to do with Imidugudu 
households being overrepresented in regions with weaker rights. Comparing Imidugudu and 
non-Imidugudu households within regions we did not observe a difference in terms of land 
rights. However, according to the interaction term estimations in Table 5, which also control 
for regional variation, there is some indication that some groups of the Imidugudu households 
– namely those headed by women or older individuals – still fare comparatively worse in 
terms of land rights.  
 and 
this is also the only interaction effect that is statistically significant (albeit only at the 10 
percent level) when focusing on rights over owned land. 
Summing up the results so far, we can observe systematic inequalities in perceived land 
rights with respect to both the total land utilised by the households – which should 
presumably hinge on systematic variation in land tenure arrangements – and the land which 
can be classified as owned. In fact, there is more evidence of inequalities in rights than in 
ownership shares, and the two do not necessarily go hand in hand. In particular, while female-
headed households do not differ significantly from male-headed households in terms of 
ownership shares, the result that they have weaker land rights is consistent over all 
specifications. While the evidence for group interaction effects is relatively limited, there is 
some indication that Imidugudu households headed by women or old individuals have 
particularly weak rights over their land. The next section explores the robustness of the main 
findings (the results are available upon request). 
 
4.1 Further testing 
 
In the benchmark estimations the key dependent variables focused on the share of a 
household’s total or owned land area that reportedly could be sold or mortgaged. To be sure 
that the results are not contingent on using land right measures focusing on the share of land 
area with rights – presumably it could be more important to have rights over a small but high 
quality plot than over a large but low quality parcel – I run (probit) estimations instead 
considering dummy variables indicating if the household perceives to have sale or mortgage 
rights over any of its total or owned plots. The observed group inequalities remain 
qualitatively the same. 
Since we are interested in the extent to which land right inequalities are due to differences 
in land tenure arrangements and to what extent they persist when focusing on land cultivated 
under similar land tenure regimes, we have considered rights over total land as well as rights 
over land that can be classified as owned. However, the owned land has been acquired 
through different means, and previous studies have shown that mode of acquisition matters 
for effective land rights (Besley, 1995; and Deininger et al., 2006). To explore whether the 
                                                 
14 The effect of being conflict-displaced is only statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) if the household 
head is 65 or older. The age effect is neither statistically significant in the displaced group nor in the non-
displaced group.  
15 The effect of living in an Imidugudu settlement is statistically significant for households where the household 
head is 49 or older. The age effect is neither statistically significant among the Imidugudu nor among the non-
Imidugudu households. 
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observed group inequalities in land rights can be explained by variation in how households 
acquire their land, I run estimations including controls for the share of the household land that 
has been inherited, purchased, acquired as a gift and obtained through other means, 
respectively. For both rights over total land and rights over owned land, the observed group 
inequality pattern in land rights remains. Unsurprisingly, compared to non-owned (leased, 
loaned, sharecropped and appropriated) land, all other types of land acquisition are associated 
with greater rights. However, it is interesting to note that out of the land shares that can be 
classified as owned, purchased land is associated with the greatest rights (followed by land 
acquired as a gift) and inherited land with the weakest rights (not always statistically different 
from rights obtained through ‘other means’ though). It thus seems inherited land comes with 
strings attached.  
The argument in Section 2.1 was that with ambiguous and negotiable land rights, land 
right inequalities are likely to originate in corresponding inequalities in terms of resources and 
social status. While the data contains no ideal proxy for social status, indicators capturing the 
household resource base are also likely to correlate with the household position in local social 
and political hierarchies (see the discussion in Section 3.2). Considering that households with 
better land rights should reap economic benefits enabling them to increase their asset base, the 
benchmark estimations did not include controls for household resources other than land.16 
With these endogeneity concerns in mind, however, it is still interesting to explore whether 
the observed land right inequalities are sensitive to further controls for household resource 
differentials. For instance, could the observed gender gap in land rights be due to female 
household heads being poorer and less educated than their male counterparts (comparing 
means confirms that they are), in turn negatively affecting their awareness of their rights as 
well as their ability to take part in costly land disputes? As it seems, no; when including 
controls for education of the household head and household economic standing,17
Moreover, the observed group inequalities in land rights are stable over a wide range of 
sub-samples. Running separate regressions for female- and male-headed households, conflict-
displaced and non conflict-displaced households, and Imidugudu and non-Imidugudu 
households, as well as restricting the sample by omitting one region at a time, the observed 
inequality patterns remain intact.
 the 
observed group inequality pattern in land rights remains unchanged. Also, the land asset 
parameters are stable in the face of the new controls (which, as expected, are both positively 
related with rights), suggesting that land assets did not simply proxy for general asset holdings 
in the benchmark setup.  
18
The benchmark results indicate better rights among households headed by older 
individuals, and seemingly suggest that this variation can be attributed to household 
composition factors and the size and structure of land holdings. Focusing on age in years and 
its square term allows the age effect to diminish or increase with age. However, it might be 
that the age variation in land rights lies between certain age groups rather than exists over the 
whole distribution. In particular, we know that the genocide produced a substantial number of 
child-headed households. If we instead use age group dummies,
 
19
                                                 
16 and household size, if thinking of the number of household members as a human capital resource. 
 the estimations still suggest 
stronger land rights among households with older household heads. Moreover, the results 
provide some indication that a particularly important breaking point lies between the youngest 
17 As measured by a dummy for having completed primary school and the log of expenditure per adult 
equivalent, respectively. 
18 The benchmark results suggested that the weaker rights reported among Imidugudu households are due to 
Imidugudu households being overrepresented in regions with weaker rights. Omitting one region at a time, it 
seems as if this result is driven by weaker rights among the Imidugudu households in the province of Kibungo. 
19 The age group dummies indicate whether the household head is under 30 (i.e. 18 or younger at the time of the 
genocide), 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 or 60 and over. 
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age group and the rest, possibly capturing the vulnerability of the child-headed households 
produced by the genocide. For rights over total land, only the difference between the youngest 
group (those under 30, who were 18 or younger at the time of the genocide) and the oldest 
groups (those over 50) survive the inclusion of controls for regional variation, household 
composition and land assets. With respect to rights over owned land, the difference (which 
does not survive the inclusion of the above mentioned controls) lies between the youngest 
group and the rest, with no statistically significant variation in rights between the other age 
groups. Most stable, however, is the tendency for households with older household heads to 
own a larger share of their land,20
 
 seemingly suggesting that the most important age variation 
in land rights emanates from differences in land tenure arrangements rather than from 
differences in rights over land cultivated under similar land tenure regimes. 
5 Conclusions 
 
Motivated by the importance of property rights institutions for economic development and by 
the recent literature suggesting within-country variation in property rights, the present paper 
explored the existence and patterns of systematic within-country inequalities in effective land 
rights.  
The basic argument behind the hypothesised land right inequalities is that the dual land 
system prevalent in many developing countries – with formal land law and customary land 
arrangements existing in parallel – gives land rights that are ambiguous and negotiable and 
thereby prone to inequalities based in status and resource differentials.  
The results of empirical estimations drawing on data on the land tenure arrangements of 
over 5,000 Rwandan households indeed suggest systematic within-country inequalities in land 
rights, with households headed by women or young individuals and households that have 
been displaced due to conflict or that have resettled in the Imidugudu village settlements all 
reporting significantly weaker rights than their respective comparison groups. The weaker 
rights reported by young house hold heads seem to be driven by household composition 
factors and the size and structure of land holdings, and the weaker rights among Imidugudu 
and conflict-displaced households appear attributable to the concerned groups being over-
represented in regions where land rights tend to be weaker. The weaker land rights observed 
for female- than for male-headed households, however, remain when accounting for region of 
residence, land assets and family composition. That the gender imbalance in land rights 
cannot be explained by observed household characteristics suggests that an unobserved factor 
– such as variation in social status – is at play. 
The same inequality pattern emerges both when considering rights over the total land 
utilised by the households – including land that is leased or sharecropped – and when focusing 
solely on rights over land that can be classified as owned. Hence, the observed inequalities are 
not only the result of systematic variation in tenure arrangements, but also exist when 
comparing households cultivating plots under similar land tenure regimes.  
Also, the identified inequality pattern is robust over a wide range of alternative 
specifications and sub-samples. It withstands using alternative land rights indicators as 
dependent variables, and remains intact when controlling for mode of land acquisition as well 
as for education and economic standing. In particular, the result that female-headed 
households report weaker rights is robust over all specifications.  
So what lessons can we draw from this? The present study considers the operation of a 
specific property rights institution – land rights – in a specific country – Rwanda. And just as 
                                                 
20 There is a statistically significant difference between all age groups, even when controlling for regional 
variation, household composition and land assets. 
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the nature of property rights is likely to vary depending on which assets they concern, the 
prevalence and pattern of land right inequalities is likely to vary across contexts. However, 
while Rwanda is an individual case, and as such is characterised by particular circumstances, 
it undoubtedly shares its dual system for land rights with many developing countries. 
Moreover, the results of the present paper are clearly in line with the treatment of land rights 
as endogenous in the previously discussed studies of land rights in other African countries. 
Hence, the findings of this paper arguably shed light on conditions relevant for many 
developing countries where property rights are ambiguous and negotiable. 
The results of the present paper indicate that unequal property rights to land constitute an 
important inequality dimension that exists on top of inequalities in terms of the size of land 
holdings. As such, they highlight the need to – unlike much of the quantitative literature in the 
field – carefully evaluate how property rights apply to different segments of the population in 
a country. Moreover, the findings point to the importance of considering effective land rights 
and, when evaluating land reform, of carefully monitoring the extent to which changes in de 
jure land legislation translate into de facto developments in the field. With respect to the 
Rwandan case, considering that the country is in the process of implementing an extensive 
land reform, it is crucial that policy makers are aware of existing inequalities in terms of 
effective land rights. With the legislative reform follows two major challenges – ensuring that 
the new law is enforced and that households are informed about its content. The results of the 
present paper can help guide this process, and provide a point of reference for future 
evaluation of the reform’s distributional effects. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Group means 
       
 
Female HHH Male HHH HHH age<30 HHH age>=30 Displaced Non-displaced Imidugudu Non-Imid. 
 
Land rights 
       Rights over total land 0.57 0.61 0.54 0.62 0.57 0.61 0.54 0.62 
Share of land owned 0.87 0.84 0.77 0.86 0.85† 0.84† 0.84† 0.84† 
Rights over owned land 0.66 0.73 0.69†† 0.72†† 0.68 0.73 0.63 0.73 
 
Land assets 
       Total land area (ha) 0.71 0.88 0.60 0.88 0.86† 0.82† 0.88† 0.82† 
Land fragmentation 0.47 0.51 0.50† 0.50† 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.51 
Share landless 0.01† 0.01† 0.02 0.01 0.01† 0.01† 0.01† 0.01† 
 
Land acquisition 
       Share of land inherited 0.54 0.46 0.50† 0.48† 0.42 0.51 0.35 0.52 
Share of land purchased 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.17†† 0.19†† 0.21 0.18 
Share of land received as gift 0.13 0.12 0.11†† 0.13†† 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.11 
Share of land loaned 0.04† 0.04† 0.07 0.04 0.04† 0.04† 0.05† 0.04† 
Share of land sharecropped 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06†† 0.07†† 
Share of land leased 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04†† 0.03†† 0.04† 0.03† 
Share obtained by alt. means 0.07† 0.06† 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.04 
 
Household composition 
       Household size 4.14 5.37 3.53 5.36 5.10†† 4.99†† 5.03† 5.02† 
Share of working age adults 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.53 0.55† 0.55† 0.56† 0.55† 
Married HHH 0.02 0.74 0.52† 0.54† 0.52† 0.54† 0.51 0.54 
Widow/er HHH 0.78 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.01† 0.01† 0.23† 0.24† 
† indicates that the difference between the concerned groups is not statistically significant; †† indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level; all 
unmarked group differences are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.  
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Table 2: Rights over total utilised land      
 
Dependent variable is share of total land holdings that can be sold or mortgaged   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Female HHH -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.047*** -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.080*** 
Group dimensions 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
HHH age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Square of HHH age -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imidugudu -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.022 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) 
Conflict-displaced -0.026* -0.034** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.007 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
OCL returnee  0.049 0.034 0.036 0.001 0.011 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.035) 
Total land (log ha)   0.045*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
Land asset controls 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Land fragmentation   -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.087*** -0.108*** 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029) 
HH size    0.003 0.003 0.003 
Household composition controls 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Share of adults    -0.043 -0.027 -0.011 
    (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Married HHH    0.053*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 
    (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) 
Widow/er HHH    0.117*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 
    (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
Region dummies  no no no no yes no 
Regional controls 
Cluster dummies no no no no no yes 
 
Constant 0.406*** 0.409*** 0.562*** 0.606*** 0.337*** 0.745*** 
 
Observations 5187 5186 5186 5186 5186 5186 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) (0.058) (0.056)  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (in Regression 6 clustered by the 440 village clusters); 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.21  
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Table 3: Share of household land that is owned      
 
Dependent variable is share of the household’s total land holdings that can be classified as owned  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Female HHH 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 
Group dimensions 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
HHH age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Square of HHH age -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imidugudu -0.000 0.000 -0.019* -0.018* -0.009 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) 
Conflict-displaced 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.015* 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
OCL returnee  -0.013 -0.039** -0.038** -0.029 0.003 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
Total land (log ha)   0.023*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 
Land asset controls 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land fragmentation   -0.177*** -0.184*** -0.209*** -0.210*** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) 
HH size    0.002 0.003 0.004** 
Household composition controls 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of adults    -0.001 0.009 0.017 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Married HHH    0.048*** 0.049*** 0.037*** 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Widow/er HHH    0.077*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Region dummies  no no no no yes no 
Regional controls 
Cluster dummies no no no no no yes 
 
Constant 0.658*** 0.657*** 0.788*** 0.803*** 0.782*** 0.779*** 
 
Observations 5206 5205 5205 5205 5205 5205 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035)  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (in Regression 6 clustered by the 440 village clusters); 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.   
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.22  
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Table 4: Rights over owned land       
 
Dependent variable is share of owned land holdings that can be sold or mortgaged   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Female HHH -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.061*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.098*** 
Group dimensions 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
HHH age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Square of HHH age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imidugudu -0.091*** -0.094*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.020 -0.011 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) 
Conflict-displaced -0.035** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) 
OCL returnee  0.067** 0.071** 0.071** 0.020 -0.002 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) 
Total land (log ha)   0.036*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 
Land asset controls 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Land fragmentation   0.043* 0.041* 0.072*** 0.051* 
   (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) 
HH size    0.001 0.001 -0.001 
Household composition controls 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Share of adults    -0.048* -0.037 -0.027 
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Married HHH    0.017 0.033* 0.034* 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Widow/er HHH    0.079*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 
    (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) 
Region dummies  no no no no yes no 
Regional controls 
Cluster dummies no no no no no yes 
 
Constant 0.624*** 0.629*** 0.703*** 0.741*** 0.434*** 0.919*** 
 
Observations 5020 5019 5019 5019 5019 5019 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.061) (0.059)  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (in Regression 6 clustered by the 440 village clusters); 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.23  
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Table 5: Estimations including group interaction terms     
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is rights over total land      
Female HHH -0.061 -0.074*** -0.070*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
 (0.049) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
HHH age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Imidugudu -0.021 -0.021 -0.002 -0.021 0.093* -0.019 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.049) (0.023) 
Conflict-displaced -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.059 -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.041) (0.015) (0.016) 
FemaleHHH*HHHage -0.001      
 (0.001)      
FemaleHHH*confl.disp.  -0.029     
  (0.029)     
FemaleHHH*Imidug.   -0.066*    
   (0.034)    
HHHage*confl.displ.    -0.002*   
    (0.001)   
HHHage*Imidugudu     -0.003**  
     (0.001)  
Confl.displ.*Imidugudu      -0.007 
      (0.031)  
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is rights over owned land     
Female HHH -0.091* -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.103*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
 (0.051) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
HHH age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Imidugudu -0.020 -0.019 -0.007 -0.020 0.062 -0.008 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.050) (0.023) 
Conflict displaced -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 0.018 -0.019 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.042) (0.015) (0.017) 
FemaleHHH*HHHage -0.000      
 (0.001)      
FemaleHHH*confl.disp.  -0.020     
  (0.030)     
FemaleHHH*Imidug.   -0.042    
   (0.035)    
HHHage*confl.displ.    -0.001   
    (0.001)   
HHHage*Imidugudu     -0.002*  
     (0.001)  
Confl.displ.*Imidugudu      -0.031 
      
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%; 
On top of the presented variables, all estimations include the controls included in Regression 5 in Tables 2-4, 
i.e. the square of HHH age, OCL returnee, total land (log ha), land fragmentation, HH size, share of adults, 
married HHH, widow/er HHH, and region dummies; The estimations in Panel A have 5,186 observations and 
an R-square of 0.09-0.10; The estimations in Panel B have 5,019 observations and an R-square of 0.11. 
(0.033)  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions         
Rights over total land: For each of their plots, the household is asked to specify whether they have the right to 
sell or mortgage the land. This variable gives the share of the household’s total land area (including land 
that is loaned, leased, sharecropped and appropriated) that reportedly can be sold or mortgaged. 
Dependent variables 
Share of land owned: The share of the household’s total land area that has been bought, inherited, received as 
a gift or obtained through ‘other’ means (meaning that leased, loaned, sharecropped and appropriated 
land is not classified as owned). 
Rights over owned land: The share of the household’s owned land (see the above definition) that can be sold 
or mortgaged.  
 
Female HHH: Dummy taking the value 1 if the head of household is female 
Group dimensions 
HHH age: The household head age in years 
Square of HHH age: The square term of the household head age in years 
Imidugudu: Dummy taking the value 1 if household reports to live in an Imidugudu settlement. 
Conflict displaced: Dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent has been displaced due to conflict 
and arrived to the current region of residence between 1994 and 2000. 
OCL: Households who have been conflict-displaced (see criteria above) and whose point of out-migration 
(proxied by the year the household settled in their current residence minus the time resided in their 
previous residence) was before 1990. 
 
Total land (ha): Total land area (in hectares) utilised by the household (i.e. including plots that are owned as well 
as those that are loaned, leased or sharecropped). 
Land assets 
Total land (log ha): log of total land in hectares (see above). 
Land fragmentation: Simpson index for farm fragmentation, calculated (based on total land area) as 1 minus the 
ratio of the sum of squared parcel areas to the squared area of the total farm. Increasing in fragmentation – 
taking the value 0 when the farm consists of a single parcel and approaching 1 for farms split into 
numerous plots of equal size.  
 
Land acquisition variables
Share of land inherited: Inherited land area / total land area  
 (Based on the question: How did you obtain the plot or if not yours, what 
arrangement is there for cultivating?) 
Share of land purchased: Purchased land area / total land area 
Share of land received as a gift: Land area received as a gift / total land area 
Share of land loaned: Loaned land area / total land area 
Share of land sharecropped: Sharecropped land area / total land area 
Share of land leased: Leased land area / total land area 
Share of land obtained by alternative means: ‘Alternative’ land area / total land area, where ‘alternative’ refers to 
the response categories ‘other’ and ‘appropriation’. 
 
HH size: The number of household members 
Household controls 
Share of adults: Share of household members that are of working age (15-64) 
Married HHH: Dummy taking the value 1 if the household head is married 
Widow/er HHH: Dummy taking the value 1 if the household head is a widow/widower 
 
Province dummies: 11 rural province dummies 
Regional controls 
Cluster dummies: 440 rural cluster dummies 
 
Interaction terms: Multiplicative terms between the group dimension variables 
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Table A2: Summary statistics 
   Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Land rights 
   Rights over total land 5188 0.60 0.43 0 1 
Share of land owned 5207 0.84 0.27 0 1 
Rights over owned land 5021 0.71 0.43 0 1 
 
Group dimensions 
   Female HHH 5279 0.28 0.45 0 1 
HHH age 5279 44.81 15.43 15 98 
HHH age<30 5279 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Conflict-displaced 5277 0.29 0.45 0 1 
OCL refugee 5276 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Imidugudu 5278 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 
Land assets 
   Total land (hectares) 5276 0.83 1.44 0 49.51 
Total land (log hectares) 5209 -0.87 1.23 -6.50 3.90 
Land fragmentation 5209 0.50 0.27 0 0.92 
Landless 5276 0.01 0.11 0 1 
 
Land acquisition 
   Share of land inherited 5207 0.49 0.42 0 1 
Share of land purchased 5207 0.18 0.31 0 1 
Share of land received as gift 5207 0.12 0.28 0 1 
Share of land loaned 5207 0.04 0.16 0 1 
Share of land sharecropped 5207 0.07 0.18 0 1 
Share of land leased 5207 0.03 0.13 0 1 
Share obtained by alt. means 5207 0.06 0.21 0 1 
 
Household composition 
    HH size 5279 5.02 2.25 1 16 
Share of adults 5279 0.55 0.24 0 1 
Married HHH 5279 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Widow/er HHH 5279 0.24 0.43 0 1 
 
